Date: 18:00 pm, February 11th, 2026

Location: TIP, Theater im Pädagog, Pädagogstraße 5, 64283 Darmstadt

Moderation: Prof. Dr. Malte Göttsche (department 5)

Away from the usual environment and outside conventional academic circles, the experimental, open format of the DenkRaumis intended to reveal the full breadth of the topic. We hope this will lead to a variety of research perspectives and lively discussion.

In cooperation with the departments of Natural Science Peace Research (Physics, Malte Göttsche), International Relations (Politics, Markus Lederer), Peace and Conflict Research (Politics, Tobias Ide) and PEASEC (Computer Science, Christian Reuter), the FiF is organising DenkRaum1.26.

“Security-related research: What are we researching at TU Darmstadt?”

The world is in turmoil and dominated by crises. The number of armed conflicts worldwide is at an all-time high, and Europe is experiencing war for the first time in many decades. Climate change, pandemics, digitalisation, the expansion of autocratic ideas and the erosion of the international order are bringing new dangers with them. Politicians and society are therefore engaged in a controversial debate about how we can guarantee our security in this situation.

This discussion must not stop at the university, and we must consider how ‘security-related research’ can and should be shaped in the future. We would like security-related research to be understood in a broad sense, as proposed by the German Council of Science and Humanities: it concerns internal and external security, resilience and the preservation of the natural foundations of society. Research can contribute to this, but it can also jeopardise it. (German Council of Science and Humanities (2025): Science and Security in Times of Global Political Upheaval | Position Paper; Cologne. (https://doi.org/10.57674/9tr5-kn29)

What needs to be done to ensure that scientists address the potential security implications of their research? And what are the consequences? This concerns both potential opportunities, such as the use of research results to create security, resilience and peace, and risks, such as the possibility of use for harmful purposes. But how do we define what constitutes useful and harmful purposes? What considerations exist between the two? What role does our civil clause play in view of the upheavals in security policy? In other words, how could and should the topic of security-related research be conceived and implemented at TU Darmstadt?

The DenkRaum aims to provide food for thought in an informal atmosphere, highlighting different perspectives, enabling changes in perspective, and encouraging further reflection even after the event. In particular, we want to stimulate discussion about the ambivalence of new technologies, especially with regard to the problem area of peace and conflict research. With this in mind, we look forward to a lively exchange.

The seventh FiF DenkRaum will take place at TIP, Theater im Pädagog, Pädagogstraße 5, 64283 Darmstadt.

Civil clauses, which were the focus of the DenkRaum, are a fundamentally sensible and welcome instrument of institutional self-regulation; however, they are currently coming under increasing political and social pressure. They operate within a tension between the need to provide an ethical framework for research and the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of science. In this way, they make it possible to highlight certain stances and spark discussions about responsibility. The central challenge is therefore to preserve civil clauses as a tool for reflection without bringing them into conflict with the openness and freedom of research.

At the same time, however, it became clear that civil clauses have structural limitations. They cannot and should not compete with academic freedom, which, as a fundamental principle of scholarly work, must remain untouchable. As soon as civil clauses function as restrictive or prohibition-oriented instruments, they face a conflict of legitimacy and run the risk of restricting the openness of research. In doing so, they potentially contradict the aim of promoting responsible science.

This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that research often cannot be clearly classified into civilian or military contexts of use. Technological research is largely characterised by ‘dual use’. This makes clear categorisation virtually impossible, especially as, in principle, many fields of research can be security-relevant. In this context, it should also be noted that the consequences of research can have direct or indirect effects. They may affect people or infrastructure, occur locally or have global repercussions. Particularly in basic research, potential consequences often remain unclear, making a reliable risk assessment virtually impossible.

Another key point is the responsibility of the researchers themselves. The view that potential consequences are unpredictable has been criticised as inadequate. Instead, there have been calls to actively address possible consequences, even if these are uncertain. Overall, there is a lack of a clear, binding framework for guidance at both the individual and institutional levels.

These challenges are particularly evident in the context of international cooperation. Cooperation with partners from countries such as China was described as ambivalent: on the one hand, there are real risks, such as through unintended knowledge transfer or political influence on research activities; on the other hand, such collaborations are often scientifically necessary and cannot be categorically classified as problematic. Civil clauses may identify these grey areas, but they do not provide sufficient mechanisms to resolve or effectively regulate them.

In response to all these issues, various approaches were outlined. These include the development of guidelines, training and awareness-raising measures, the establishment of institutional networks, and the designation of contact persons for security-related issues. Ethics committees were also cited as a key instrument for assessing risks more systematically, particularly with regard to potential military or security-related applications. It was emphasised that existing categorisations of dual-use research are increasingly inadequate and require a fundamental reassessment. If everything is subject to ‘dual use’, the characteristic of ‘dual use’ lacks a clear distinguishing feature.

Looking ahead, it should be noted that, in the long term, civil clauses should be understood less as a regulatory instrument and more as an ethical framework for guidance. Their strength lies in sparking discussions, making responsibility visible and promoting institutional reflection processes. However, they are not sufficient on their own to address the challenges of security-related research.

In future, it will be crucial to develop complementary structures, differentiated legal regulations, strengthened ethics committees and institutional procedures that systematically take into account and support both knowledge production and potential application contexts. At the same time, the individual responsibility of researchers remains central. A research culture that actively engages with its societal impacts cannot be replaced by formal regulations alone.

Overall, there are signs of a shift away from rigid prohibitions towards flexible, process-oriented approaches that acknowledge uncertainties and allow for continuous evaluation. In this context, academic freedom must be regarded as the overarching principle, within which responsibility must not be restricted but rather consciously exercised and shaped.