The challenge:

How can the proliferation of nuclear weapons be prevented when states fundamentally distrust one another and, at the same time, technological developments are constantly opening up new possibilities for the use of nuclear technologies? At the heart of this lies the question of how international treaties can not only be concluded, but also permanently enforced and verified. Whilst the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime to this day, its effectiveness depends crucially on whether violations can be detected and proven. The challenge therefore lies less in formulating political declarations of intent than in developing technical and institutional procedures that replace trust with verifiable knowledge. For in some respects one need only think of Iran and North Korea there are indeed limits to what we know.

At the same time, there is a fundamental tension between the civilian use and the military misuse of nuclear technologies. In light of this, how can control mechanisms be adapted to technological developments?

From the lecture:

Although the nuclear-weapon states have so far failed to adequately fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations and are currently even rearming, the significance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not measured solely by its success in disarmament. Equally crucial is the question of how many more states would possess nuclear weapons today if this regime did not exist.

Central to this approach is the concept of verification. International treaties can only function effectively if compliance with them can be independently verified and non-compliance can be sanctioned. Organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are responsible for monitoring nuclear activities and ensuring transparency regarding nuclear programmes. The so-called safeguards are not intended to completely prevent nuclear activities, but rather to ensure their traceability. The aim is to determine what materials are being produced, what technical capabilities exist, and whether these are compatible with the commitments made.

It is important to emphasise that public perception is often shaped by crises such as those involving Iran or North Korea. This can easily obscure the fact that the vast majority of states fulfil their obligations and that the verification mechanisms function largely successfully in day-to-day practice. It is precisely these unseen successes that form an essential part of international security.

Another key focus is on the scientific advancement of verification technologies. Particular attention is paid to the use of data-driven methods and artificial intelligence. These are used to analyse large volumes of historical documents, reconstruct nuclear activities or identify possible tampering in archives. Research in the field of verification is thus increasingly becoming an interdisciplinary field that combines approaches from the natural sciences, engineering and data science.

Furthermore, new measurement methods could be relevant for future disarmament and control measures. A key challenge lies in being able to verify whether a state actually possesses a nuclear warhead or whether declared disarmament steps have in fact been implemented. To this end, methods are being developed that measure characteristic radiation signatures, thereby enabling conclusions to be drawn about the presence of nuclear material.

Outlook:

The use of nuclear weapons ultimately remains dependent on the political decisions of individual actors and is therefore not entirely predictable. It is precisely for this reason that technical control mechanisms and institutional verification structures are becoming increasingly important.

At the same time, it is becoming clear that technological developments are constantly changing the demands placed on international control regimes. New reactor designs, data-driven analytical methods and the use of artificial intelligence open up new possibilities for monitoring and transparency on the one hand, but also create new control challenges on the other. Research into verification technologies is thus itself becoming a field of action relevant to security policy.